The objectives of this study were to develop a high-density chromosome bin map of homoeologous group 7 in hexaploid wheat, to identify gene distribution in these chromosomes, and to perform comparative studies of wheat with rice and barley. We mapped 2148 loci from 919 EST clones onto group 7 chromosomes of wheat. In the majority of cases the numbers of loci were significantly lower in the centromeric regions and tended to increase in the distal regions. The level of duplicated loci (...) in this group was 24% with most of these loci being localized toward the distal regions. One hundred nineteen EST probes that hybridized to three fragments and mapped to the three group 7 chromosomes were designated landmark probes and were used to construct a consensus homoeologous group 7 map. An additional 49 probes that mapped to 7AS, 7DS, and the ancestral translocated segment involving 7BS also were designated landmarks. Landmark probe orders and comparative maps of wheat, rice, and barley were produced on the basis of corresponding rice BAC/PAC and genetic markers that mapped on chromosomes 6 and 8 of rice. Identification of landmark ESTs and development of consensus maps may provide a framework of conserved coding regions predating the evolution of wheat genomes. (shrink)

Early versions of satellite and radiosonde datasets suggested that the tropical surface had warmed more than the troposphere, while climate models consistently showed tropospheric amplification of surface warming in response to human-caused increases in greenhouse gases. We revisit such comparisons here using new observational estimates of surface and tropospheric temperature changes. We find that there is no longer a serious discrepancy between modeled and observed trends in the tropics. Our results contradict a recent claim that all simulated temperature trends in (...) the tropical troposphere are inconsistent with observations. This claim was based on the use of older radiosonde and satellite datasets and on two methodological errors: the neglect of observational trend uncertainties introduced by interannual climate variability and application of an inappropriate statistical “consistency test”.This emerging reconciliation of models and observations has two primary explanations. First, because of changes in the treatment of buoy and satellite information, new surface temperature datasets yield slightly reduced tropical warming relative to earlier versions. Second, recently developed satellite and radiosonde datasets now show larger warming of the tropical lower troposphere. In the case of a new satellite dataset from remote sensing systems, enhancedRSS warming is due to an improved procedure of adjusting for inter-satellite biases. When the RSS-derived tropospheric temperature trend is compared with four different observed estimates of surface temperature change, the surface warming is invariably amplified in the tropical troposphere, consistent with model results. Even if we use data from a second satellite dataset with smaller tropospheric warming than in remote sensing systems RSS, observed tropical lapse rates are not significantly different from those in all model simulations.Our results contradict a recent claim that all simulated temperature trends in the tropical troposphere and in tropical lapse rates are inconsistent with observations. This claim was based on the use of older radiosonde and satellite datasets and on two methodological errors: the neglect of observational trend uncertainties introduced by interannual climate variability and application of an inappropriate statistical “consistency test”. (shrink)

In the _Proslogion_, St. Anselm presents a philosophical argument for the existence of God. Anselm's proof, known since the time of Kant as the ontological argument for the existence of God, has played an important role in the history of philosophy and has been incorporated in various forms into the systems of Descartes, Leibniz, Hegel, and others. Included in this edition of the_ Proslogion _are Gaunilo's "A Reply on Behalf of the Fool" and St. Anselm's "The Author's Reply to Gaunilo." (...) All three works are in the original Latin with English translation on facing pages. Professor Charlesworth's introduction provides a helpful discussion of the context of the _Proslogion_ in the theological tradition and in Anselm's own thought and writing. (shrink)

The second highest level of the divided line in Plato’s Republic (510b-511a) appears to be about the entities of mathematics—entities such as particular (though non-physical) triangles. It differs from the highest level in two respects. It involves reasoning from hypotheses, and it uses visible images. This article defends the traditional view that the passage is indeed about these mathematical ‘intermediates’; and tries to show how the apparently different features of the second level are related, by focussing on Plato’s need to (...) give an account of how we can speak of many particulars of the same kind, without assuming that they are imperfect copies, in the way sensible things can be imperfect copies, of forms. (shrink)

The most common way of proving decidability in propositional modal logic is to shew that the system in question has the finite model property. This is not however the only way. Gabbay in [4] proves the decidability of many modal systems using Rabin's result in [8] on the decidability of the second-order theory of successor functions. In particular [4, pp. 258-265] he is able to prove the decidability of a system which lacks the finite model property. Gabbay's system is however (...) complete, in the sense of being characterized by a class of frames, and the question arises whether there is a decidable modal logic which is not complete. Since no incomplete modal logic has the finite model property [9, p. 33], any proof of decidability must employ some such method as Gabbay's. In this paper I use the Gabbay/Rabin technique to prove the decidability of a finitely axiomatized normal modal propositional logic which is not characterized by any class of frames. I am grateful to the referee for suggesting improvements in substance and presentation.The terminology I am using is standard in modal logic. By aframeis understood a pair 〈W, R〉 in whichWis a class (of “possible worlds”) andR⊆W2. To avoid confusion in what follows, a frame will henceforth be referred to as aKripkeframe. By contrast, ageneral frameis a pair 〈,Π〉 in whichis a Kripke frame andΠis a collection of subsets ofWclosed under the Boolean operations and satisfying the condition that ifAis inΠthen so isR−1“A. A model on a frame (of either kind) is obtained by adding a functionVwhich assigns sets of worlds to propositional variables. In the case of a general frame we require thatV(p) ∈Π. (shrink)

In Book Γ of the Metaphysics Aristotle states and attempts to prove what he calls the basic principle of the science of being as being: the law of non‐contradiction. In this paper I defend an interpretation of his proof, inspired by Elizabeth Anscombe's 1961 essay in ‘Three Philosophers’, though some of its features were remarked on by Lukasiewicz in 1910, according to which Aristotle is proving this principle only for substance predicates, and that it is to be understood as the (...) basic principle of metaphysics rather than of logic. It is the principle that every substance has an essential nature, and if it is of the essential nature of x to be F then it cannot be of the essential nature of x to be not‐F since then x's being F and x's being not‐F would be the same. He puts it by saying that in such a case F and not‐F would ‘signify the same’ for x. Since they do not, x cannot be both. (shrink)

To comprehend pain, disease, death and suffering as being meaningful - beyond the firing of synapses, the collapse of human abilities, and the mere end of life - requires a context in which to evaluate essential connotations, as well as to place and integrate understandings. If pain and suffering are to have enduring significance, they must be situated within a nest of ontological background assumptions, standards of inquiry, and epistemological foundations. Where secular bioethics fails to give deep meaning to suffering, (...) Christian bioethics succeeds. This essay analyzes the divergent meanings of suffering endorsed by the various Christian religions as conceptualized through the different metaphysical, epistemological, and sociological assumptions of each religion. (shrink)

The paper presents an indexical semantics, based on times and worlds, for some of Prior's logics concerned with issues such as foreknowledge and determinism. In that sense Prior's logic of futurity can be presented as a completely standard modal/tense logic.

We distinguish two types of cases that have potential to generate quasi-cyclical preferences: self-involving choices where an agent oscillates between first- and third-person perspectives that conflict regarding their life-changing implications, and self-serving choices where frame-based reasoning can be “first-personally rational” yet “third-personally irrational.” We argue that the distinction between these types of cases deserves more attention in Bermúdez's account.

Modal logic is the logic of necessity and possibility, of ‘must be’ and ‘may be’. These may be interpreted in various ways. If necessity is necessary truth, there is alethic modal logic; if it is moral or normative necessity, there is deontic logic [see chapter 8]. It may refer to what is known or believed to be true, in which case, there is an epistemic logic [chapter 9], or to what always has been or to what henceforth always will be (...) true, which gives an aspect of temporal logic [chapter 10]. Another interpretation is to read ‘Necessarily p′ as ‘it is provable that p′ This chapter will present the general framework of modal logic applicable to all of these, though with emphasis on alethic modal logics. (shrink)

The second of these lines seems to be the result of an interpolation designed to spell out the implicit sense of the first. In 241–6 Ion has expressed amazement that Creusa should be weeping at the sight of Apollo's sanctuary, a sight which brings other visitors joy. She prefaces her explanation of this with an assurance which in its transmitted form is elegantly translated by Grégoire: ‘Il n'est point discourtois de ta part, étranger, de marquer ta surprise au sujet de (...) mes pleurs.’ But there are reasons for doubting I the authenticity of line 248: Line 247 is self-sufficient, as is shown by IA 1402: τ μν σόν, νενι, γενναίως χει. This also gives the closest parallel for the use of τ σόν in reference to the attitude which a previous speaker's words have just expressed. Other instances of τ σόν, tout court, are helpfully grouped in Allen and Italie's Concordance to Euripides, s.v. σός. τ σόν…[adverbial phrase] χει occurs also in Hek. 1195 and Med. 312; cf. HF 165, Hel. 893, Pho. 995 with τομόν. These make it unlikely that τ χόν in our passage is to be taken adverbially, as perhaps Grégoire intended with ‘de ta part’, rather than as subject of χει. Tro. 82 might be adduced for the alternative , but there is no reason for Creusa to be saying emphatically ‘as far as you are concerned’. (shrink)

The thesis identifies two strands in Rorty’s philosophy. One is an orientation towards practice in opposition to the traditional philosophical emphasis on theoretical knowledge. The other is Rorty’s anti-representationalist conception of knowledge. Rorty argues that these strands are mutually supporting, while the author argues they are incompatible. The nominal aim of Rorty’s anti-representationalism is to overcome many traditional dualisms of theoretical philosophy, such as subject and object, mind and world, and theory and practice. The thesis argues that anti-representationalism does not (...) and cannot achieve this aim, since what is required to overcome these dualisms is the recognition of the practical basis of knowledge, with which anti-representationalism is incompatible. The author agrees with much of Rorty’s critique of foundationalist epistemology, but argues in opposition to Rorty that anti-representationalism does not follow necessarily from this critique. Where Rorty locates the error of traditional epistemology in the very notion that knowledge and language can represent the world, the author argues that this idea is benign. The fundamental problem is the desire to anchor our conceptual scheme to an external structure independently of human practice — but this idea can be rejected without abandoning the notion of representation. The thesis also looks to explain why Rorty takes anti-representationalism to follow naturally from a rejection of foundationalism. The motivation is located in Rorty’s fundamental metaphysical orientation, which is naturalistic. Anti-representationalism is the product of the wish to promote a naturalistic worldview without succumbing to scientism. In this way Rorty hopes to unite the manifest and scientific images of man. The author argues that this cannot be done from within a naturalistic metaphysics. (shrink)

The principal question of this paper is: Why are religious values special in refusal of lifesaving medical treatment? This question is approached through a critical examination of a common kind of refusal of treatment case, one involving a rational adult. The central value cited in defence of honouring such a patient's refusal is autonomy. Once autonomy is isolated from other justificatory factors, however, possible cases can be imagined which cast doubt on the great valuational weight assigned it by strong anti-paternalists. (...) This weight is sufficient, in their estimation, to justify honouring the patient's refusal. There is thus a tension between the strong anti-paternalist's commitment to the sufficiency of autonomy and our intuitions respecting such cases. Attempts can be made to relieve this tension, such as arguing that patients aren't really rational in the circumstances envisaged, or that other values, such as privacy or bodily integrity, if added to autonomy, are sufficient to justify an anti-paternalistic stance. All such attempts fail, however. But what does not fail is the addition of religious freedom, freedom respecting a patient's religious beliefs and values. Why religious freedom reduces the tension is then explained, and the specialness of religious beliefs and values examined. (shrink)

Expressions in a language, whether words, phrases, or sentences, have meanings. So it seems reasonable to suppose that there are meanings that expressions have. Of course, it is fashionable in some philosophical circles to deny this.

First published in 2002. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

' I heartily recommend it to any philosopher of language interested in the issues. [] Logicians, of course, will want to savour the whole thing.' Australian Journal of Philosophy, 71:3 (1993).

In this paper, I offer a view beyond that which would narrowly reduce the role of parents in medical decision making to acting as custodians of the best interests of children and toward an account of family authority and family autonomy. As a fundamental social unit, the good of the family is usually appreciated, at least in part, in terms of its ability successfully to instantiate its core moral and cultural understandings as well as to pass on such commitments to (...) future generations. The putative rights of children to expression, information, freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and to freedom of association with others are, in this essay, assessed from the perspective of those conditions necessary for the family to function as a moral community. In so doing, I respond to the move to liberate children from parental authority and to effect the transformation of the family as implied by the United Nations’ "Convention on the Rights of the Child" and the pediatric bioethics it supports. (shrink)

The Geological Society of London was the first learned society to be devoted solely to geology, and its members were responsible for much of the spectacular progress of the science in the nineteenth century. Its distinctive character as a centre of geological discussion and research was established within the first five years from its foundation in 1807. During this period its activities were directed, and its policies largely shaped, by its President, George Bellas Greenough, on whose unpublished papers this account (...) is chiefly based.The Society began as a small scientific dining club in London, but it developed rapidly into a learned society with a nation-wide membership. It became so independent in outlook and so active in research that it was felt to threaten the esteem of the Royal Society; and little more than a year after its foundation it clashed with the Royal Society so violently that its continued existence was for a time uncertain.Its development into a large independent society was the outcome of its ‘Baconian’ view of the importance of collecting geological facts as a surer basis for geological theories. For this purpose it initiated an ambitious scheme for co-operative research, which would unite the efforts of ‘philosophers’ with those of ‘practical men’. Only personal reasons seem to have kept the most prominent of the practical men—William Smith—from co-operating with the Society. (shrink)

Semantic Indexicality shows how a simple syntax can be combined with a propositional language at the level of logical analysis. It is the adoption of such a base language which has not been attempted before, and it is this which constitutes the originality of the book. Cresswell's simple and direct style makes this book accessible to a wider audience than the somewhat specialized subject matter might initially suggest.

Adverbial modification is probably one of the least understood areas of linguistics. The essays in this volume all address the problem of how to give an analysis of adverbial modifiers within truth-conditional semantics. Chapters I-VI provide analyses of particular modifiers within a possible worlds framework, and were written between 1974 and 1981. Original publication details of these chapters may be found on p. vi. Of these, all but Chapter I make essential use of the idea that the time reference involved (...) in tensed sentences should be a time interval rather than a single instant. The final chapter (Chapter VII) was written especially for this volume and investigates the question of how the 'situation semantics' recently devised by Jon Barwise and John Perry, as a rival to possible-worlds semantics, might deal with adverbs. In addition I have included an appendix to Chapter III and an introduction which links all the chapters together. (shrink)

In this article, transhumanism is considered to be a quasi-medical ideology that seeks to promote a variety of therapeutic and human-enhancing aims. Moderate conceptions are distinguished from strong conceptions of transhumanism and the strong conceptions were found to be more problematic than the moderate ones. A particular critique of Boström’s defence of transhumanism is presented. Various forms of slippery slope arguments that may be used for and against transhumanism are discussed and one particular criticism, moral arbitrariness, that undermines both weak (...) and strong transhumanism is highlighted. (shrink)

In Roper v. Simmons (2005) the United States Supreme Court announced a paradigm shift in jurisprudence. Drawing specifically on mounting scientific evidence that adolescents are qualitatively different from adults in their decision-making capacities, the Supreme Court recognized that adolescents are not adults in all but age. The Court concluded that the overwhelming weight of the psychological and neurophysiological data regarding brain maturation supports the conclusion that adolescents are qualitatively different types of agents than adult persons. The Supreme Court further solidified (...) its position regarding adolescents as less than fully mature and responsible decisionmakers in Graham v. Florida (2010) and Miller v. Alabama (2012). In each case, the Court concluded that the scientific evidence does not support the conclusion that children under 18 years of age possess adult capacities for personal agency, rationality, and mature choice. This study explores the implications of the Supreme Court decisions in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v. Florida, and Miller v. Alabama for the “mature minor” standard for medical decision making. It argues that the Supreme Court’s holdings in Roper, Graham, and Miller require no less than a radical reassessment of how healthcare institutions, courts of law, and public policy are obliged to regard minors as medical decisionmakers. The “mature minor” standard for medical decision making must be abandoned. (shrink)

David Lewis's modal realism claims that nothing can exist in more than one world or time, and that statements about how something would have been are to be analysed in terms of its counterpart. I first explain why the counterpart relation depends on de re modal statements in an intensional language, so that intuitive properties of similarity relations cannot be used to show that the counterpart relation is not an equivalence relation. I then look at test sentences in (the intensional) (...) natural language, and show that none of them provide compelling evidence that a counterpart semantics is needed. (shrink)

In Kidney for Sale by Owner: Human Organs, Transplantation, and the Market, I argued that the market is the most efficient and effective—and morally justified—means of procuring and allocating human organs for transplantation. This special issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy publishes several articles critical of this position and of my arguments mustered in its support. In this essay, I explore the core criticisms these authors raise against my conclusions. I argue that clinging to comfortable, but unfounded, notions (...) that human body parts are not commodities, that the physician-patient relationship transcends commercial practices, and that medicine rises above market-place morality (where “market-place morality” is presented rhetorically as a criticism) leads to a real failure adequately to appreciate the complex reality of modern medicine. Denying the illicit moral intuitions that commodification of body parts is immoral or that it necessarily violates human dignity would benefit donors and recipients alike, while also reinforcing virtuous transplantation practice and policy. Honestly acknowledging the medical marketplace would shed light on what is often a hazy and shrouded policy setting. At stake is not solely the efficiency of procuring human organs for transplantation but also the recognition of the moral authority of persons over themselves. (shrink)